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Market Reaction to Announcement of Hedge Fund Activism and Takeovers: 





This paper studies the impact of hedge fund activism and takeovers on 
public firms in the United States of America.  The research examines 
samples of 13D filings which show that a positive abnormal return is 
achieved when activists announce their intentions for a target company. I 
have taken sample data from the SEC EDGAR website between 2005 and 
2012. The significant positive abnormal return for the activism target firm is 
calculated as 11 percent around the announcement date. The returns are 
explained by the performance of hedge fund activists and the process by 
which they force target firms into takeovers.  The paper also shows that the 
firms targeted by the activists have a higher probability of being acquired. 
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1.1 Purpose of Study 
This paper investigates the ways activist hedge funds influence the sale of target firms 
and how they affect the market share of firms that were involved. The research explains 
how the market reacts to the announcement of a hedge fund activists’ involvement in a 
firm and why this involvement results in takeovers and higher returns. The paper also 
showcases that the firms targeted by the activists have a higher probability of getting 
merged or acquired.  
To construct a sample for this paper, I have used schedule 13D filings from the SEC 
website that is filed by the activist hedge funds, if they have ownership of above 5 
percent in the target firm.  
1.2 Background 
Means and Berle (1932) discussed in their book the conflict of interest between 
ownership and control, which gave the foundation to the corporate governance field. This 
conflict of interest causes a separation between shareholders and management and 
imposes agency costs on the shareholders. In their book they mentioned that the 
managers have all the control and that the shareholders are powerless. 
During the 1980s, shareholder activism became a new phenomenon in the field of 
corporate governance. In the paper by Grossman and Hart (1980), they explained that 
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shareholders do not spend funds on monitoring managers, as the incentive is small and it 
is shared with other investors who bear no cost: the free rider issue. These shareholder 
activists however, have large ownerships in public companies and are now known as 
“shareholder champions” as they resolve conflict between powerless shareholders and 
management. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) explained that large shareholders may mitigate 
the free rider problem faced by minority investors as the cost incurred by shareholders to 
monitor the management is covered by the return they get on the large size of their 
ownership in a target company.   
In this earlier period, shareholder activists’ efforts were often proved to be ineffective in 
monitoring firm management. For example, in a paper by Karpoff (2001), he concluded 
that firm’s performance has very little to do with the role of investor activists. In some 
circumstances institutional investors have tried to change the management, but have 
always faced resistance with high costs and are often unsuccessful. The reasons behind 
the ineffectiveness in changing the management could be explained by the conflicts of 
interest and legal and regulatory constraints faced by these institutions. As a result, these 
large shareholders generally prefer to sell the stocks of firms that are poorly managed, 
rather than staying the course and making a change in the management.  
The activist hedge fund, an evolved form of shareholder activism was introduced in late 
1990s to the corporate governance framework. During 2002 they firmly established 
themselves as investors who could force target management to agree with their 
alternative strategic proposal. If the proposal was ignored, the activist may start a 
campaign and fight to realize their demands. In recent years, hedge funds have gained 
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popularity worldwide with unconventional investment strategies and extraordinary 
returns. 
This paper examines the abnormal return achieved by the activists by forcing target firms 
into takeovers. One of the reasons for the takeovers is that the activists invest in 
companies which they perceive as undervalued or mismanaged. Activist purchases large 
number of shares and try to get involved in the company’s Board and the management.  
According to recent research findings, hedge funds monitor management better than the 
institutional shareholders. As an activist they have diversified portfolios with large assets 
under management and face fewer legal and regulatory constraints. Kahan and Rock 
(2006) conclude that the existence of few regulatory constraints and high incentives make 
hedge fund activism less costly and more successful than the institutional investors. Also, 
the announcement of a hedge fund activist’s involvement in a target firm usually results 
in positive abnormal returns. 
Hedge fund activism has faced criticism. For example, Katz and McIntosh (2007) 
comment as follows: 
“Ignoring the long-term interests of public companies and the interests of traditional 
shareholders, hedge fund activists often have pressured companies to sell themselves, in 
whole or in part, or to incur significant debt to fund large scale stock buybacks.”  
There has been considerable research on mergers and acquisitions, with target firms 
earning high positive returns while the acquirers have attained zero or negative returns. 
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The reason for the failure of the merger to the acquiring party would be the rationale on 
which the deal is based.  
1.3 Need for Study 
One of the hypotheses is that the hedge funds are good at identifying companies which 
are undervalued and find potential buyers for them. Under this hypothesis, investors 
expect high returns as they believe that the firms will be acquired soon at a good 
premium. From the activist’s point of view, merger or acquisition is the best way to exit 
the target firm. 
For this paper I have collected data from the SEC website for the schedule 13D filings 
between 2005 and 2012, focusing on events in the United States. The sample covers 
many events and in addition, the ten years will help me analyze the long-term returns. 
One of the main objectives of this paper is that the target firms will earn “good” returns 
for the period in which the activists help the target firm to either merge or be acquired.  
This study was inspired by Greenwood and Schor’s (2007) paper that argues that hedge 
fund activists’ main purpose is to make a profit from the takeover premium by selling the 
target firm. Although this may not be true in a broader scale of data, the paper does show 
importance of mergers and acquisitions for hedge fund activism. This has galvanized me 
to write a research paper on takeovers that involve hedge fund activists’ campaigns, 
considering both the takeover and the activism aspect. It investigates the reason hedge 
fund activists’ induce the takeover process and how this activist involvement affects the 
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short - term market share of the target and acquiring firms. This paper also discusses the 
consequences of the takeover deal for the target firm. 
1.4 Statement of Purpose 
The objective of this research paper is to find out the roles hedge fund activists have in 
takeovers of target firms and how it affects the value distribution for the firms involved. 
This objective could be explained by the following hypothesis: 
1. H0 The announcement of activist’s involvement through the filing of schedule 
13D does not lead to market reaction of positive short- term return. 
1. H1 The announcement of activist’s involvement through the filing of schedule 
13D does lead to market reaction of positive short- term return. 
2. H0 The announcement of takeover does not lead to positive abnormal returns 
for the target company 
2. H1   The announcement of takeover does lead to positive abnormal returns for 
the target company  




As mentioned in Chapter 1, this research is motivated by the paper of Greenwood and 
Schor (2007) which concluded that a hedge fund activist’s only motive in initiating an 
activist campaign is to sell their target firm and make a profit from the takeover premium. 
The research also speaks about the importance of takeovers for hedge fund activists.  
2.1 Hedge funds 
In recent times hedge funds have become a worldwide popular investment tool, being 
subject to both appreciation and criticism. They raise capital from high net worth 
individuals and are less regulated compared to other funds such as, mutual and pension 
funds. They have flexibility when it comes to investing; they can take speculative 
positions in derivatives such as options and can short stock. Being an illiquid investment, 
hedge fund investors have to give advance notice if they want to sell their holdings. The 
managers of hedge fund try to seek positive returns and for that they demand very high 
fees (SEC, 2003; Brown et al. 1999; Coggan, 2008). The investment record of hedge 
funds easily exceeds the other funds available in the market.  
Hedge funds have been criticised of playing a negative role in the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis by affecting the financial system with their risky strategies. At the beginning of 
2008 there were more than 10,000 hedge funds with approximately $1.9 trillion assets 
under management.  Many hedge funds have gone out of business largely due the 
financial crisis and as a result many investors pulled back their assets, which put the total 
Page 11 of 38 
 
assets under management to approximately $1.3 trillion at the end of June 2009. 
Nevertheless, hedge funds have come back strongly and once again have become an 
important part of our financial system. 
It is believed that Alfred Winslow Jones founded the first hedge fund in the late 1940s. 
He opened an investment fund on the basis of picking stocks that he thought would 
increase in value. To minimize the risk, he took short positions in other stocks, thereby 
“hedging his risk”, from which the hedge fund term originates. Jones develops a new 
strategy known as market – neutral: taking long positions in undervalued stocks and 
simultaneously take short positions in overvalued stocks. This strategy provided leverage 
to invest more with limited resources, to potentially earn higher returns (Brown et al., 
1999).  
2.2 Hedge Fund’s Strategies 
Hedge funds use a variety of strategies to achieve positive returns. These can be divided 
into four categories: arbitrage, direction, equity long-short and event-driven. 
An arbitrage fund as the name suggests, exploit the market efficiencies to gain risk free 
positive returns using complicated statistical models to find correlations between various 
stocks. Directional funds forecast trends in different markets such as stocks, commodities 
or currency, and create their portfolios accordingly. The equity long-short strategy was 
used by Alfred Winslow Jones in 1950s, by taking long and short positions in order to 
minimize market risk. Event-driven hedge funds try to force companies into merger or 
acquisition and make profit from the premium. Mergers create lots of price volatility in 
the target firm that provides investment opportunities for hedge funds. 
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Finally, when companies fail to invest in a good investment opportunities and share price 
falls, hedge funds try to get involved with the company’s management .These types of 
hedge funds are known as activist hedge funds. 
2.3 What is hedge fund activism? 
There are many interventions used by shareholders if they are not satisfied with the 
performance of a target firm. This intervention includes shareholders voting against 
motions of the Board at AGM’s and EGM’s: selling of their shares. According to Jensen 
and Ruback (1983), investor activism is defined as: 
“Holding large debt or equity positions in a company and actively participating in its 
strategic direction”.  
This definition best explains the earlier forms of activism because it doesn’t explain the 
impact activists have on the sale of a firm by opposing the management. Jensen and 
Ruback definition of activist was used by Bethel, et al  (1998) in creating a sample of 
pension funds, money managers, banks and insurance companies that held a large 
ownership in firms that actively participate in share repurchases and asset divestiture. 
They sometimes have been referred to as ancestors to today’s activists (Brav et al. 2008). 
There are several reasons why activist hedge funds are so successful than shareholder 
activists. Bratton (2007) believes that the institutional activists free- rider problem have 
not been resolved completely and hence proxy fights is the only way to make major 
changes in a target company. 
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2.4 Does activism create value? 
The opinions as to whether hedge funds create value through their activism vary greatly. 
There are many issues regarding what type of value the activist might create and for 
whom. The market believes that hedge funds activists are short termed and have their 
own interests Bainbridge (2005), which is against the shareholders or the company’s long 
- term prospect. Partnoy, et al (2006) found that the abnormal return generated by the 
hedge fund activist is between 5 to 7 percent in the short- term and their involvement 
improves the operating performance of the target firm.  
In contrast to study done on shareholder activism, by (Karpoff, (2001) showed an 
insignificant impact on firm performance and operations. 
Mayer, et al (2006) concluded that the UK pension fund Hermes outperformed the 
relative benchmark after the involvement of activist investors. Similar results were shown 
by Klein and Zur (2007).  




This chapter explains the methodology used to calculate the results for activism and 
takeovers. I will use an Event study to calculate the performance of both hedge fund 
activism and takeovers, with the date of the initial 13D filing and the announcement of 
takeover as event dates.  
Measuring abnormal returns 
The daily price for the companies was collected from the WRDS database. The return can 
be calculated by the percentage change relative to the previous day i.e.: 
                                                                                          3.1 
For any stock i, the return at time t can be written as: 
    Rit = Kit + eit                                                         3.2 
Kit is the normal return and eit the abnormal return. The unexpected component of the 
security is measured by eit which can be written as: 
    eit = Rit - Kit                                                                                                                                            3.3 
To calculate Kit, I will use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Market Model approach. In 
this instance, the model uses past values of a stock i relative to the S&P 500 index 
denoted as m to calculate expected return in future. The formula to calculate expected 
return Kit is: 
Kit = αi +βiRmt                            3.4 
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Where αi and βi  are the intercept and slope respectively of the OLS regression between 
daily return of stock i and the daily return of the market m over a given period. 
The market model to calculate the abnormal return is calculated by: 
eit = Rit  - (αi +βiRmt )            3.5 
The intercept αi and the slope βi must be calculated during the estimated period before the 
event date. For the hedge fund activism event the estimation window consist of 260 
trading days return starting before the filing. The intercept and slope calculated in this 
period is used for the initial 13D filing event date.  
3.1 Short - term returns 
To calculate the abnormal returns I will use the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
method. CAR calculates the cross- sectional mean abnormal return and add them over a 
given time period. This methodology was used by Greenwood and Schor (2007) for 
activism and Bradley et al. (1988) for the announcement day return.  
I calculate the abnormal returns for 20 trading days before and after the event. To test if 
there is any significant abnormal returns on any specific day, the mean abnormal (AR) is 
calculated using the formula: 
         3.6 
The 20 trading day period is chosen to check for any leaked information on the of 13 D 
filing by the activist. To test the hypothesis on short term returns, the Cumulative 
Abnormal Return is calculated over different period. The formula for CAR for time 
period t1 and t2 is:  
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             3.7 
The daily CARs and ARs are calculated for target firms around the announcement of the 
initial 13D filing and the announcement of the takeover.  
3.2 Data 
To construct an event sample, data were collected from the SEC EDGAR database by 
merging all Schedule 13D and Def 14A filings for the eight year period between 2005 
and 2012. I collected 776 events of Schedule 13 D filings filed by 41 hedge funds 
between the eight year periods. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 13Ds are filled with 
Securities and Exchange Commission within 10 days by the acquirer after attaining 
ownership of more than 5 percent in the target firm. The schedule 13D form includes the 
name of the target firm, the name of filer(s), the number of shares purchased, acquisition 
date and the purpose of transaction. Purpose of transaction item gives the detail of the 
transaction explaining whether the ownership is a passive or an active investment. In 
active investment, the activist gets involved in an event such as merger, to make changes 
in firms’ structure and to make changes in corporate governance. 
Several papers such as Ruback and Mikkelson (1985) stated that mergers are followed by 
the announcement of minority ownership. To the sample of 13Ds, the data also include 
Def 14A filings which are filed by investors who are involved in proxy fight against the 
firm’s management.  
To create the event list, “Purpose of Transaction” statement helped in identifying whether 
or not the hedge fund activist is pursuing an activist strategy. If the ownership is only for 
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the purpose of “investment”, then those data were excluded from the sample. However, 
these passive investment filing were used in some of the tests which follow. For each 
hedge fund activist and target firm, there are multiple filings which results because of the 
changes in the activist position in the target firm. Most of such filings are excluded from 
the sample for which the purpose of transaction is not changed. I then take out events 
where the initial filing was more than two years before the takeover became effective of 
the target company. If the period between takeover and initial 13 D filing was more than 
two years, it is assumed that there was no intention of selling the target firm.  
The Schedule 13D statements imply that the hedge fund activist demands are classified in 
to seven categories: (1) involvement with the management, (2) corporate governance 
issues, (3) involvement in proxy contest, (4) capital structure issues, (5) sale of target 
firm, (6) blocking merger or acquisition, and finally, (7) bankruptcy and financing issues. 
Activists are grouped according to Schedule 13D filings, and not by the target firm’s 
action. 
In addition to the data included in the “Purpose of Transaction” statement, the SEC 
allows activist’s to file more filings as exhibits. These exhibits could be press releases or 
letters to its Board or to the management of the target firm. These filings, along with the 
statements in Item 4 of the schedule 13D, contribute to the market with the explanation of 
action the hedge fund activist needs the firms to take.  
The price of target firm is gathered from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) 
and to calculate the abnormal returns, the S&P 500 index is used. The event sample 
consists of daily return for trading days before the initial filing and the takeover date. 




4.1 Activism results 
The returns of hedge fund activism around the 13D filing date, using the market model 
are shown in Appendix A. The first part of Appendix A show the daily breakdowns of the 
average returns of the hedge fund activism event sample for 1 month (20 trading days) 
before and after the 13D filing event date. For abnormal performance measurement 
methods the event date (t=0) is significantly positive at returns of 1.7% . The days before 
and after the 13D filing are both significantly positive. The daily breakdown for both 
measurements shows that many days in the month before and after the 13D filing are 
significantly positive, although none as significant as the event date.  
This pattern was also observed by previous studies and could be caused by several 
factors. Firstly, several hedge fund activists could file their initial 13D filings in a single 
target company close together as a so-called ‘wolf pack’. Secondly, there could be a 
market reaction prior to the 13D filing due to the accumulation of a 5% stake by the 
activist. Thirdly, here could be some information leakage on the transaction, as the 13D 
filing only needs to be made within 10 days after the stake has been acquired82. Finally 
there are two contrasting explanations for the positive returns in the days after the event. 
Assuming an efficient market, the significantly positive returns can be due to the release 
of new information after the initial 13D was filed (Klein & Zur, 2006). However the 
positive returns could also be a sign of an imperfectly efficient market reaction after the 
event date and that the market underreacted to the 13D filing. 
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 In this chapter, we try to prove whether the hypothesis is correct, or whether (a) the 
announcement of activist’s involvement through the filing of Schedule 13D does not lead 
to market reaction of positive short- term return, or (b) the announcement of merger does 










The Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) surrounding the schedule 13D filing date for  
3 trading day CAR is 3.4 percent, while for 20 trading day before and after the 13D 
filing, the target firm’s CAR is 12.2 percent. The CARs recorded are more than those 









Target takeover returns 
The event date return for takeover is statistically significant and positive, with abnormal 
return of 9.5 percent. The results of daily returns suggest that, in comparison to the 13D 
filing, there is negligible information that is leaked in the trading days before and there is 
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CARs for many event windows are statistically significant and positive. The CAR return 
for the 10 trading day window is 17.6 percent and for the 3 day window is 15.8 percent. 








The purpose of this paper was to show the role of hedge fund activists in takeovers. The 
activism where a takeover is pursued generates maximum return during the initial 13D 
filing. Furthermore, activism campaigns enhance the probability that the target firm will 
eventually be acquired, thereby increasing the likelihood of takeover premium.  
The paper suggests that activists mainly target small firms as most of these firms are 
undervalued and underperform compared to other industries, having negligible analyst 
coverage.  The activists should have ownership of more than 5 percent in pursuing target 
firm for any takeover. If these hedge fund activisms carry on with such development, 
these activists may become successful at pursuing larger firms for takeovers. 
The activist’s target firm CARs around the initial filing day is around 1.2 percent to 10.3 
percent for a 40 days window. The positive return during the month of 13D filing 
provides evidence of information leakage. The paper shows that the market includes the 
probability of selling of the target firm prior to the announcement. Also there is no impact 
on the short- term return of the acquirer during the takeover.  
Activism announcement return hypotheses 
1. H0 The announcement of activist’s involvement through the filing of schedule 13D 
does not lead to market reaction of positive short term return. 
    H1   The announcement of activist’s involvement through the filing of schedule 13D 
does lead to market reaction of positive short term return. 
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On the date of filing there are significant positive abnormal returns seen among different 
windows around the 13D filing date. Hence we can say that there is significant market 
reaction on the announcement of 13D filing. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis. 
2. H0     The announcement of takeover does not lead to positive abnormal returns for the 
target company 
2. H1     The announcement of takeover does lead to positive abnormal returns for the 
target company  
It can be seen that there is significant positive short-term returns for the target companies 
around the takeover announcement. Hence we reject the null hypothesis.  
This paper has some limitations such as small sample and limited number of hedge fund 
activists which were included. The small sample has therefore affected the significance of 
the test and also the measurement of abnormal returns. 




There are several questions which can be investigated in the future regarding the long-
term returns created for the acquirers firm. This can be shown by investigating the 
performance of the acquirer firm post acquisition. This research could also study the 
types of acquiring firms and their corporate governance structure. 
Another recommendation would be to search how different ‘timings’ of certain strategy 
in the activist campaign, such as acquiring a seat on the Board affects the market 
reaction. There could be some investigation regarding the bargaining power of hedge 
fund activist as well as the method of payment influencing the takeover.  
Finally, the decline in short-term return for target firms due to the information leakage 
(like CEO resignation) could further be investigated. This research could provide more 
details about the hedge fund activism and in general the takeover process. 
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Requirements of the purpose of transaction item in the SEC Schedule 13D filing 
Item 4. Purpose of Transaction 
State the purpose or purposes of the acquisition of securities of the issuer. Describe any 
plans or proposals which the reporting persons may have which relate to or would result 
in: 
The acquisition by any person of additional securities of the issuer, or the disposition of 
securities of the issuer; 
An extraordinary corporate transaction, such as a merger, reorganization or liquidation, 
involving the issuer or any of its subsidiaries; 
A sale or transfer of a material amount of assets of the issuer or any of its subsidiaries; 
Any change in the present Board of directors or management of the issuer, including any 
plans or proposals to change the number or term of directors or to fill any existing 
vacancies on the Board; 
Any material change in the present capitalization or dividend policy of the issuer; 
Any other material change in the issuer's business or corporate structure, including but 
not limited to, if the issuer is a registered closed-end investment company, any plans or 
proposals to make any changes in its investment policy for which a vote is required by 
Section 13 of the Investment Company Act of 1940; 
Changes in the issuer's charter, bylaws or instruments corresponding thereto or other 
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actions which may impede the acquisition of control of the issuer by any person; Causing 
a class of securities of the issuer to be delisted from a national securities 
exchange or to cease to be authorized to be quoted in an inter-dealer quotation system of 
a registered national securities association; 
A class of equity securities of the issuer becoming eligible for termination of registration 
pursuant to Section 12(g)(4) of the Act; or 
Any action similar to any of those enumerated above. 
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            Distribution of takeover announcements  per year 
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Abnormal returns around initial 13D-filing,market model returns 
 
Page 33 of 38 
 
Abnormal returns around initial 13D-filing, market adjusted returns 




capture log close 
log using MFIN6690_EventStudyClass, replace 
use "C:\Users\abhinav\Downloads\date2.dta", clear 
gen year=year(date_ann) 
keep if year>=2009 & year<=2011 
sort permno date_ann 
tempfile 13D2009 
quietly save `13D2009', replace 
bysort permno: gen eventcount=_N 
bysort permno: keep if _n==1 
sort permno 
keep permno eventcount 
tempfile eventcount 
quietly save `eventcount', replace 
clear 
use "C:\Users\abhinav\Downloads\crsp2009_2011.dta", clear 
gen year1=year(date2) 
keep if year>=2009 & year<=2011 
sort permno date2 
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tempfile crsp_data2009_2011 
quietly save `crsp_data2009_2011', replace 
sort permno 
merge permno using `eventcount' 
tab _merge 




sort permno date2 
by permno date: gen set=_n 
sort permno set 
tempfile crsp_data2009_2011_new 
quietly save `crsp_data2009_2011_new', replace 
use `13D2009', clear 
by permno: gen set=_n 
sort permno set 
tempfile 13D2009_new 
quietly save `13D2009_new', replace 
use `crsp_data2009_2011_new', clear 
merge permno set using `13D2009_new' 




egen company_id =group(permno set) 
sort company_id date2 
by company_id: gen datanum=_n 
by company_id: gen target=datanum if date2==date_ann 
egen tempdate=min(target), by(company_id) 
drop target 
gen diff=datanum-tempdate 
by company_id: gen event_window=1 if dif>=-5 & dif<=5 
egen count_event_obs=count (event_window), by(company_id) 
by company_id: gen estimation_window=1 if dif<-30 & dif>=-120 
egen count_est_obs=count (estimation_window), by(company_id) 
replace event_window=0 if event_window==. 
replace estimation_window=0 if estimation_window==. 
drop if count_event_obs<11 
drop if count_est_obs<90 
drop if estimation_window==0 & event_window==0 
gen predicted_return=. 
egen id =group(company_id) 
sum id, detail 




while `i'<=id_N { 
display "Estimating normal performance for firm: " `i' 
quietly reg ret sprtrn if id==`i' & estimation_window==1 
predict p`i' if id==`i' 
replace predicted_return=p`i' if id==`i' & event_window==1 
drop p`i' 
local i=`i'+1 
sort id date2 
gen abnormal_return=ret-predicted_return if event_window==1 
by id: egen cumulative_abnormal_return=sum(abnormal_return) 
sort id date2 
by id: egen ar_sd = sd(abnormal_return) 
gen test= (1/3)*(cumulative_abnormal_return/ar_sd) 
reg cumulative_abnormal_return if dif==0, robust 
preserve 
collapse (mean) abnormal_return, by(diff) 
twoway scatter abnormal_return diff if diff>=-5 & diff<=5, xlab(-5(1)5) c(1) xline(-1) 
xline(0) xline(1) 
restore 
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preserve 
collapse (mean) cumulative_abnormal_return, by(diff) 
twoway scatter cumulative_abnormal_return diff if diff>=-5 & diff<=5, xlab(-5(1)5) c(1) 
xline(-1) xline(0) xline(1) 
restore 
 
capture program drop bootcumret 
program define bootcumret, rclass 
 reg cumulative_abnormal_return if diff==0 
return scalar cumret=_b[_cons] 
end 
bootstrap boottest=r(cumret), reps(1000) saving (boot_diffret, replace): bootcumret 
save event_study_file2009, replace 
log close 
